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rule. 18 4 The need of extrinsic proof should not necessarily bar invocation of CPLR 3213.
CPLR 3215(c): Default not equivalent to admission of allegations of
complaint.
CPLR 3215(c) provides that a plaintiff must seek entry of judgment within one year after default or see the complaint dismissed as
abandoned unless said plaintiff shows sufficient reason why the court
should not so dismiss.135 The purpose of this section is to prevent plain136
tiffs from unreasonably delaying termination of their actions.
In Ballard v. Billings & Spencer Co. 3 7 plaintiff secured restoration
of this action to the trial calendar by falsely stating that all pleadings
had been served. At the time defendants United and Houdaille had
been in default for more than one year, but plaintiff's conduct indicated
that he had expected them to serve their answers eventually. While a
jury was being selected, defendants learned that plaintiff intended to
treat their failures to answer as admissions of the complaints' allegations. Plaintiff refused to accept proposed answers, and the trial court,
exasperated by the defendants' dilatoriness, denied their motions to
serve answers and for mistrial and directed trial of the issue of damages
only.138 Defendants appealed inter alia the court's denial of their motions to serve answers.
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, ruled that denial
13 9
of the motions was an abuse of discretion and ordered a new trial.
Express limiting statutory provisions thwarted the trial court's attempt
to punish defendant's failure to move to vacate the note of issue including a certificate of readiness stating that all pleadings had been
served by equating default with admission of complaint.140 Plaintiff
could not circumvent CPLR 3215(c). 141 Plaintiff suffered no legal prejudice by the default, for he was aware of defendants' positions, and
in fact waived the default. Since the law prefers disposition of cases
134Accord, Instituto Per Lo Sviluppo Economico Dell 'Italia Meridionale v. Sperti
Prods., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
135 see 7B McKlNNEY'S CPLR 3215, commentaries 11-13 (1970); 4 WK&M J 3215.133215.16.
1386 See 4 WK&M
3012.09.
'37 36 App. Div. 2d 71, 319 N.Y.S.2d 191 (4th Dep't 1971).
1381d. at 73-75, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 193-95.
139 Id. at 76, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
140 See DeRosa v. La Sala, 31 App. Div. 2d 745, 297 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1969);
Herzbrun v. Levine, 23 App. Div. 2d 744, 259 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Ist Dep't 1965); Kohn v. Kohn,
3012.09;
5 Misc. 2d 288, 158 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1957); 4 WK&M
3215.13-3215.14 (1969).
141 36 App. Div. 2d at 75, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
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upon their merits in the absence of prejudice, interposition of the
142
answers should have been permitted.

Perhaps treatment of defaults as admissions of the complaints is a
proper solution to the problem of dilatory calendar practice. Nevertheless, such sanction has not been authorized by the Legislature. The
appellate division's decision in Ballard is both consistent with the
relevant statutes and just in the circumstances of the case, especially in
light of plaintiff's culpability in filing a false note of issue and in not
applying for judgment upon the default. Nevertheless, an attorney
should seek entry of judgment within one year of default as directed
by GPLR 3215(c), to avoid the sundry problems inherent in failure
to comply.
Res Judicata: Doctrine applicable only to those issues actually raised
in prior taxpayer suit.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, when a cause of action has been
adjudicated on the merits, the parties to the action and their privies are
bound by the judgment, in which the cause of action merges, and may
not relitigate the same cause of action between themselves. 143 The
general rule is that
[a] judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one not only
as to any matters actually litigated therein, but also as to any that
might have been litigated, when the two causes of action have
such a measure of identity that a different judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the
first .... 144

The doctrine of res judicata applies to class actions. 145 The United
States Supreme Court held that "[w]here the parties interested in the
suit are numerous," convenience requires that "the decree bind[s] all
of them the same as if all were before the court.' 46 A judgment
rendered in a taxpayer suit has been held in New York to bar a subsequent suit by different taxpayers. 47 Is the scope of the doctrine as
142

Id. at 76, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 196.

143
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§ 68, comment a at 294 (1942).

144Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B&C Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165
N.E. 456, 457-58 (1929). See Pagano v. Arnstein, 292 N.Y. 526, 331, 55 N.E.2d 181, 183
(1944); 5 WK&M 5011.17. See, e.g., Hochster v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 260 App.
Div. 712, 719, 24 N.Y.S.2d 110, 117 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd without opinion, 288 N.Y. 588,
42 N.E.
2d 600 (1942).
145
See In re Sullivan's Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1953);
5 WK&M 5011.35.
146 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 803 (1857).
147 Campbell v. Nassau County, 274 App. Div. 929, 83 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep't 1948);
see Ashton v. City of Rochester, 133 N.Y. 187, 192-94 (1892); People's Gas & Elec. Co. v.

